What is cbrn

Hence, the first important development that was identified in the scan refers to the demise of existing CBRN arms control treaties. The accusations eventually accumulated in the withdrawal of both parties from the treaty, leaving Europe exposed to potential renewed deployment of intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles on their soil. The demise of the INF treaty seems to be a symptom of a wider trend, in which political actors are questioning and criticizing current arms control agreements.

For example, in anticipation of the expiration of New START in , important actors in the US government and military have expressed doubts about the chances that New START will be renewed and are questioning whether the treaty even should be renewed.

They cite Russian violations of the INF treaty and the fact that various arms control treaties do not include states like China. Finally, other cornerstones of the CBRN arms control architecture are under pressure as well. Many states are disappointed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT because they consider the disarmament efforts of the treaty not being met.

Experiments with lethal viruses seem to violate the Biological Convention BWC , and last but not least there are accusations without convincing evidence so far that Russia has been testing low-yield nuclear weapons in violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT.

Hence, trust issues regarding the multilateral system on CBRN weapons emerge. A second worrisome development is the fact that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is lowering. This can be envisioned in the changing political rhetoric on nuclear weapons, including implicit threats of using nuclear weapons and the perception that the use of nuclear weapons is an actual option available for states.

Likewise, the fact that the US Nuclear Posture Review allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear threats signals a perception that nuclear weapons can legitimately be used, even if a state is not being attacked with nuclear weapons first. In addition, when states regard the use of nuclear weapons as legitimate, they directly violate the NPT, as they are not working towards a world without CBRN weapons. Another important trend that was identified in the Horizon scan, is the increasing proliferation of CBRN technology.

Several experts are worried about the nuclear programmes of Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the case of Saudi Arabia, experts are concerned that the civilian nuclear programme might be a steppingstone towards the actual development of nuclear weapons. Experts assume that Saudi Arabia would want to develop these weapons in order to match the capacities of Iran.

Iran has so far restrained from taking serious steps towards the direct development of nuclear weapons, but the country is, since the withdrawal of the US, already diverging form the limits set under the JCPOA.

The proliferation of CBRN technology however, is not limited to states. Besides these national programmes, developments in science and technology and the diffusion of knowledge make the access, use, and proliferation of CBRN technologies easier for non-state actors.

This is especially valid for advances in the biological and chemical fields. Lastly, a problem that continuously persists, is that there is no effective sanction regime that condemns the use of CBRN weapons.

In particular, the perceived impunity of the use of chemical weapons bears the risk of undermining the global norm against chemical weapons set by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In recent years, chemical weapons were used in Syria, Malaysia and the United Kingdom, which shows that actors, state and non-state, are not withholding themselves from using this type of weapon.

This is closely related to the fact that, so far, few serious consequences were faced by the perpetrators. Hence, this perceived impunity may encourage other actors to use chemical weapons as well. Table 2 provides an overview of the expectation with reference to the trends regarding the international order considering CBRN weapons.

As the above discussion demonstrates, the trends and developments considering CBRN weapons are not reassuring. On the contrary, they lead to concerns about the future of arms control, and hence the future of our national security situation.

Therefore, the trends identified in the Horizon scan and described in this research paper leave a number of important questions to be answered, as well as a number of important implications that need to be addressed by Dutch and European policymakers. Firstly, a nuclear arms race is lurking, especially considering the pressure with which the nuclear arms controls regime has to cope recently.

It is important that the Netherlands and their fellow EU members should collectively consider which options they have at their disposal to prevent such an arms race. Where this is the case, any further deployments into hazard zones will be carefully planned and subject to deliberate allocation of tasks against specific objectives.

Developed and maintained by the NFCC. Bookmark Section. There are distinct differences between the responses to a hazardous materials incident and a CBRN e attack, consideration should be given to the following when responding to a CBRN e incident: The potential for further attacks and the involvement of other devices The need for the early collection and effective exploitation of forensic data The potential opportunity to apprehend perpetrators at or close to the scene Due to these differences, the response to a CBRN e will involve an immediate, co-ordinated, multi-agency response, which may require: Concurrent investigations Access to specialist advice A clear and consistent media and public reassurance strategy and customised procedures Plans, training and equipment to protect responders Help in detection or categorisation of the substance involved Evacuation of the public The decontamination of those contaminated and the management of fatalities Emergency services CBRN e response framework.

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